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the US from 2006 to 2012, which covers the subprime and European sovereign debt crisis. We apply the Granger
causality test and a vector auto-regression to examine the change of causality structure. Our results show that
contagion exists from medium-term bond markets to equity markets; REIT, money markets and short-term
bond markets show little evidence of cross-asset contagion with other markets; and the currency market
shows high co-movement and contagion with equity markets. Our ﬁndings provide more rewarding asset
reallocating strategies for the investors who invest in both bond and equity markets before a crisis to consider
reallocating their portfolio into REIT and money markets to beneﬁt from diversiﬁcation during a crisis period.
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This study examines the effectiveness of domestic diversiﬁcation by
testing for evidence of cross-asset contagion among real estate invest-
ment trusts (REIT), money, stock, bond, and currency markets, which
are themain investment segments of investors' portfolio in any country.
Our goal is to pinpoint the causality of a crisis transmission and its
mechanisms to help domestic investors efﬁciently allocate their assets
in a crisis.
Most previous studies focus on cross-border contagion (e.g., Caporale
et al., 2005; Dungey et al., 2006; Gray, 2009;Matei, 2010) or cross-border
and cross-asset contagion between different countries (Hartmann et al.,
2004; Baur and Lucey, 2009; Baur, 2010). Studies associated with cross-
asset contagion within a country are relatively few and quite recent.
Also, prior literature usually tests only two of the ﬁve asset segments ad-
dressed in this research. For example, most studies of cross-asset conta-
gion focus on the interaction of stocks and bonds (Baur and Lucey,
2009; Baur, 2010; Longstaff, 2010), stocks and currency (Hegerty,
2012), or stocks and REITs (Nneji et al., 2013); only a few focus on the
stock–REIT–credit default swap–energy markets (Guo et al., 2011) or
other such combinations.
Our study adds to the literature in at least twoways. First, unlike prior
studies, we test contagion of 12 ﬁnancial products in ﬁve kinds of assets,g).
. This is an open access article underwhich implies more potential choices of asset reallocation for diversiﬁca-
tion.We choose the ﬁve assets that aremost essential, available, and com-
mon to investors' portfolios; these assets are alsomost commonly adopted
in previous studies. Second, our sample period of 2006 to 2012 includes
the subprime crisis of 2007 and the European sovereign debt crisis of
2009. Thus, we can examine whether contagion from the real estate mar-
ket (in this case, theREITmarket),which is assumed to be the originator of
the subprime crisis, spreads to other main ﬁnancial markets within a
country and whether the European sovereign debt crisis changes the
structure of causality in the subprime crisis.
We investigate contagion between ﬁve domestic markets—REITs,
bond, equity, money, and currency—using the Granger's (1969) causal-
ity test and a vector auto-regression (VAR)method. These tests indicate
whether Y market has more explanatory power to inﬂuence X market
after a crisis and straightforwardly examine the contagion by the
change of the causality structure. We separate the sample period into
six subsample periods to compare the causality structure before and
after the two crises. We use local currency to account for the daily
market data for the United States, which has the largest REIT market
in the world, to avoid currency risk and to avoid the loss of important
signs of contagion, which may occur within a few days.
Our results provide several key ﬁndings. First, the currency market
and the medium-term bond market are the origin of contagion to the
equity rather than REITmarket in theUnited States during the two crisis
periods. Second,moneymarkets and short-termbondmarkets show lit-
tle evidence of cross-asset contagion with other markets. Finally, thethe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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equity both before and after the two crisis periods. Therefore, investors
should consider reallocating their portfolios into money markets and
short-term bond markets to beneﬁts from diversiﬁcation. However,
holding U.S. dollars and equity at the same time is not beneﬁcial.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2
reviews the empirical literature concerning contagion in ﬁnancial
asset returns. Section 3 describes the approaches used to test the
evidence for contagion. Section 4 provides the data set and empirical
results. Finally, Section 5 concludes this study by summarizing the
main ﬁndings.
2. Literature review
According to Forbes and Rigobon's (2001) deﬁnition, contagion is
the change in the risk transmissionmechanisms that occurs during a pe-
riod of turmoil. Contagion can also be deﬁned as a signiﬁcant increase in
the cross-asset or cross-border (cross-market) linkages after a shock.
Therefore, even if two markets show a high degree of co-movement
during a period of stability, contagion does not exist if the cross-
market linkages do not signiﬁcantly increase after the shock.
The channels of contagion can be classiﬁed into two categories (Glick
and Rose, 1999; Dornbusch et al., 2000; Collins and Biekpe, 2003;
Caporale et al., 2005; Dungey et al., 2006; Hegerty, 2012; Nneji et al.,
2013). Dornbusch et al. (2000) conclude that the ﬁrst channel is the real
linkages such as trade, ﬁnancial, and political links between markets.
The second channel is the change in investor behavior, which is a
nonfundamental factor between two independent markets. Changes in
investor behavior can have several causes. First, investors with herd be-
havior may review bad information on robust markets without any new
information because of the information asymmetric. Second, twomarkets
may drop together when investors withdraw their money in robust mar-
kets tomaintain the liquidity of their portfolios. Finally, most institutional
investors reallocate their assets to maintain speciﬁc restrictions based on
the law or contracts, such as the cap and ﬂoor of investing speciﬁc asset
classes and the ﬁxed percentage of asset allocation.
Previous literature focuses on cross-asset and cross-border conta-
gion using four methods: (i) correlation of asset prices; (ii) conditional
probability of currency crises; (iii) volatility changes; and (iv) co-
movements of capital ﬂows and rates of return. The correlation coefﬁ-
cient analysis employed by the ﬁrst method (Forbes and Rigobon,
2002; Hon et al., 2004; Pretorius and de Beer, 2004; Syllignakis and
Kouretas, 2011; Chang and Chen, 2014) has a statistical bias due to
the omitted variables, endogeneity, and heteroscedasticity. In addition,
specifying the origin and receiver of contagion and the inﬂuence of
propagation of shocks over time is difﬁcult using this method. Although
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) use an adjusted (unconditional) correlation
coefﬁcient analysis to eliminate the bias of heteroscedasticity, the as-
sumption of no omitted variables and endogeneity still inﬂuence the
empirical results. Prior research seldom uses the conditional probability
of currency crises and volatility changes methods.
We use the co-movements of capital ﬂows and rates of return by
employing the Granger causality test within a VAR framework, which
is widely used in previous literature (Collins and Biekpe, 2003; Sander
and Kleimeier, 2003; Bodart and Candelon, 2009; Gray, 2009; Baur,
2010; Longstaff, 2010; Matei, 2010; Hegerty, 2012). Bodart and
Candelon (2009) ﬁnd three advantages to this method. First, the Grang-
er causality test is based on the dynamic framework (VAR), which can
explain the lead–lag relation by the signiﬁcant level of parameters in
the model during a crisis period. Second, if the VAR framework is
correctly speciﬁed, our approach is free from the omitted variable
problem that occurs in research using a contemporaneous correlation.
Third, causality allows for the asymmetric dimension of contagion. By
changing the causality structure, Matei (2010) examines the contagion
phenomenon during the subprime crisis for seven European Union and
non-European Union countries and applies a Granger causality/vectorerror correctionmodelmethod on sovereign bond spreads as ameasure
of perceived country risk.Mateiﬁnds evidence of contagion of sovereign
bond spreads from Germany to Finland and Japan, Finland to Portugal,
France to Portugal and Japan, and England to Portugal and Japan during
the subprime crisis. Gray (2009) examineswhether the contagion of the
banking crisis in the United States and western Europe in August 2007
spills over to the currencies of Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, and the Euro zone. Before August
2007, no Granger-causality exists between these eight European
Union zones. Gray (2009) concludes that the contagion of currency
occurs from Poland and Hungary to six other zones with evidence of
signiﬁcant Granger-causality from August 2007 to October 2008.
Most of previous studies on contagion investigate cross-border
contagion related to globalization and the increasing number of global
institutional investors who focus on a speciﬁc kind of asset such as glob-
al bond funds, global world equity funds, or money market funds. Most
studies ﬁnd that the beneﬁts of international diversiﬁcation prior to a
crisis are greatly reduced during a crisis when cross-border contagion
occurs because the markets drop together with signiﬁcant co-
movement after a crisis period (Caporale et al., 2005; Bond et al.,
2006; Dungey et al., 2006; Haile and Pozo, 2008; Bacchiocchi and
Bevilacqua, 2009; Chang and Chen, 2014; Gorea and Radev, 2014;
Morales and Andreosso-O'Callaghan, 2014). For example, Bond et al.
(2006) test the contagion across the REITs markets of major developed
economies during the Asian crisis. They ﬁnd evidence that the Hong
Kong real estate market is the originator of contagion and Australia,
the United States, Singapore, and Japan are the receivers of contagion
over this period. Chang and Chen (2014) expand the study of cross-
border contagion between global REIT market during the 2007–2009
global ﬁnancial crisis with the daily REIT indices for 16 countries. They
assume that the U.S. market is the origin of contagion and, using a cor-
relation analysis, ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of contagion from the
United States to Singapore,Malaysia, Taiwan, andNewZealand. Howev-
er, Baur (2010) argues that few studies focus on cross-asset or cross-
border contagion. Therefore, he analyzes and compares the relation of
cross-country and cross-asset linkages between global equity and
bond markets using daily continuously compounded MSCI stock and
bond index returns from the United States, the United Kingdom,
Germany, France, Italy, Australia, Canada, and Japan from January
1994 until September 2006. Baur separates the sample period into 26
subperiods. He ﬁnds that few causality effects exist from bond to stock
markets or from stock to bond markets in several subperiods; the U.S.
stock and bond markets affect foreign stock and bond markets, respec-
tively; and the inﬂuence of theU.S. stock andbondmarkets increases for
all countries and dominates other inﬂuences such as the effects of a
country's own stock or bond markets. Baur concludes that the beneﬁts
of cross-asset diversiﬁcation outperform those of cross-country diversi-
ﬁcation because the correlations of cross-asset portfolios are lower than
those of cross-country portfolios in those subperiods.
Most of the few studies that examine cross-asset contagion provide
limited beneﬁts to the domestic investors in terms of diversiﬁcation
and asset reallocation because they only examine the interaction of two
or three kinds of assets, such as stocks and bonds (Hartmann et al.,
2004; Baur and Lucey, 2009; Baur, 2010), stocks and currency (Hegerty,
2012), and stocks, REITs, and real estate (Nneji et al., 2013), which are
the main investment segments for most investors' portfolios. For exam-
ple, Baur and Lucey (2009) examine ﬂight to quality andﬂight fromqual-
ity and reject the existence of contagion between stock and bondmarkets
within a country and cross-asset contagion of stock and bond investment
in six crises from January 1994 to December 2006. They only ﬁnd direct
evidence of stock–bond contagion in the United States, Australia, and
Italy after the September 11, 2001 crisis. Nevertheless, most countries ex-
perience ﬂight from quality, such as during the Enron crisis (December.
2001), and ﬂight to quality, such as during the Russia crisis (August
1998), which indicates the beneﬁts of the domestic diversiﬁcation.
Nneji et al. (2013) use a regime-switching bubble model of returns to
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the stock market bubble's inﬂuence on the securitized real estate market
bubble is stronger than that of the property market.
A few recent studies provide more potential opportunities of domes-
tic diversiﬁcation by testing the cross-asset contagion of four kinds of as-
sets (Longstaff, 2010; Guo et al., 2011). For example, Longstaff (2010)
examines the evidence of contagion during the subprime crisis from
2006 to 2008. He investigates whether the ABX market of subprime
asset-collateralized debt obligations, which is viewed as the prime vector
of contagion, inﬂuences four other major markets: Treasury bonds, cor-
porate bonds, S&P 500 stock indexes, and theVIX. To increase the beneﬁts
of his cross-asset contagion research results, Longstaff chooses 12 ﬁnan-
cial products in different markets including 1-year Treasury, 10-year
Treasury, ABX indexes with ratings from AAA to BBB–, Moody's AAA
and Baa corporate spread, the S&P 500 Financials index, the S&P 500
index, and the VIX. Using the VAR framework and Granger causality. He
divides the sample period into three subperiods: the 2006 pre-crisis peri-
od, the 2007 subprime crisis period, and the 2008 global crisis period.
Longstaff (2010) concludes that ABX index returns can signiﬁcantly
forecast stock returns, Treasury bond yield, and corporate bond yield
changes by asmuch as threeweeks ahead. In otherwords, he ﬁnds signif-
icant evidence of cross-asset contagionof ABX index returns to othermar-
kets during the subprime crisis. However, Longstaff's (2010) study has
certain limitations. First, he only examines the uni-directional contagion
from the collateralized debt obligations market to other markets. Second,
some of ﬁnancial product types that he chooses such as ABX indexes and
theVIX are not available to investors in all countries. Therefore, to provide
more beneﬁts to follow-up researchers and investors, we select products
and markets that are easily available in most countries. In addition, we
conduct two-way contagion tests between ﬁnancial products of different
markets so that we can more clearly identify the origin of contagion.
3. Data and method
3.1. Data
Weuse the daily close prices of the 12most common ﬁnancial prod-
ucts in the United States: the REIT indices of the indirect real estatemar-
ket; the S&P 500; the Nasdaq; the PHLX semiconductor; the Dow Jones
indices of the equity market; the 1-year T-bill of the moneymarket; the
1–3 year (short-term), 3–5 year (medium-term), 5–7 year (medium-
term), 7–10 year (long-term), and above 20 years (long-term) govern-
ment bonds; and the U.S. dollar index of currency market. We collect
the indices and data from DataStream and calculate the daily returns
of indices as the difference in natural logarithms, as Rt = ln(Pt/Pt−1).
Our sample period is from January 2006 to December 2012.
Daily data is used in our study based on three assumptions. First,
daily data provides more information than low frequency data
(Narayan and Sharma, 2015) andmore appropriate to reﬂect the results
of all market transactions in a day (Phan et al., 2016). Second, daily data
is widely available and reliable for studying asset returns (Narayan and
Narayan, 2012). Third, the frequency of daily data is high enough for re-
liable statistic results.
The structural breaks of different periods are constructed based ondif-
ferent market events (Longstaff, 2010; Guo et al., 2011; Syllignakis and
Kouretas, 2011; Narayan and Narayan, 2012). The ﬁrst structural break
starts from July 2007 when the US subprime default rates are soaring.
The second structural break starts from March 2009 when the US Fed
carries out theﬁrst round of quantitative easing (QE1). The third structur-
al break starts from December 2009 when the Greek government bond
crisis is spreading. The fourth structural break starts from March 2011
when the European Union adopts the Euro Plus Pact. To examine conta-
gionby comparing the change in causality structure,wedivide the sample
period into six subperiods. These six subperiods include the three
subprime crisis periods and three European sovereign debt crisis periods,
each deﬁned as pre-crisis, in-crisis, and after-crisis, respectively. Period 1(Period 2, Period 3), corresponding to the subprime crisis, runs January 1,
2006–July 31, 2007 (August 1, 2007–March 30, 2009; March 31, 2009–
December 7, 2009). Period 4 (Period 5, Period 6), corresponding to the
European sovereign debt crisis, runs March 31, 2009–December 7, 2009
(December 8, 2009–March 11, 2011; March 12, 2011–December 31,
2012). See the Appendix A for details. The after-crisis period of the
subprime crisis (Period 3) and the pre-crisis period of the European sov-
ereign debt crisis (Period 4) overlap, which allows us to determine
whether the causality of a crisis transmission changes between the recov-
ery of subprime crisis and the onset of the European sovereign debt crisis.
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the daily return series of the
12 ﬁnancial products, which are calculated as natural logarithms of the
original indices in the sample period. The total number of observations is
1826. Of these 12 ﬁnancial products, both equity and REIT returns have
a standard deviation greater than 1% and outperformotherﬁnancial prod-
ucts. The p-value of the Jarque Bera statistics in column 10 shows that all
return series distributions in all market are signiﬁcantly far from
exhibiting normality, implying that an underlying normal distribution as-
sumption in asset returns in the correlation coefﬁcient analysis may be vi-
olated. However, it is not violated in the VARs and Granger causality that
we apply in this study. In addition, our method is suitable only if our
time series of daily returns are stationary. Therefore, we conduct an aug-
mentedDickey–Fuller unit root test (Dickey andFuller, 1979). The null hy-
pothesis of the augmentedDickey–Fuller test is that our time series have a
unit root. Tables 2 and 3 provide the results of the tests for the three sub-
periods of the subprime crisis and the three subperiods of European sover-
eign debt crisis, respectively. All series are stationary and have no unit
roots. These ﬁndings mean that these series are proper for us to use in
our VAR framework.
3.2. Method
To provide evidence on the changes in crisis causation, we use
Granger's (1969) causality approach, which is applied by Matei (2010),
to examine the change of the causality structure and the directions of
causality between 12 ﬁnancial products in ﬁve markets during crisis pe-
riods. This method suggests that x(y) Granger causes y(x) if the lag
event x(y) can predict event y(x) by testingwhether adding lagged values
of x(y) can improve the explanation. The Granger approach, which
identiﬁes a bivariate VAR model with a time lag length of k, is
xt ¼ αx þ∑
k
i¼1
βx;i  xt−i þ∑
k
i¼1
γx;i  yt−i þ ex;t ð1Þ
yt ¼ αy þ∑
k
i¼1
βy;i  yt−i þ∑
k
i¼1
γy;i  xt−i þ ey;t ð2Þ
We examine the coefﬁcients of y and x in Eqs. (1) and (2), respec-
tively, to capture the information on Granger causality. We set up and
test the k value (lag value) between 1 and 10 becausewewant to exam-
ine the Granger causality in two weeks. The robustness analysis of ap-
plying different k values to the VAR model shows that the appropriate
k values are 6 (10) for the test ofmodel of Granger causality of subprime
(European sovereign debt) crisis. We then test these values with a stan-
dard F-test to determine whether all γis (where i = 1, k) are equal to
zero (H0:γx = 0). If we cannot reject the null hypothesis (H0:γx = 0)
in Eq. (1), we can conclude that y Granger causes x. Likewise, if we can-
not reject the null hypothesis (H0:γy = 0) in Eq. (2), we can conclude
that x Granger causes y. However, the equations written previously
are suitable only if our time series are stationary in level (i.e., I(0)). For
this reason, we apply the augmented Dickey–Fuller test (Dickey &
Fuller, 1979), which is themost commonly usedmethod to test station-
ary. The augmented Dickey–Fuller test refers to.
xt ¼ α þ γxt−1 þ
Xk
i¼1ρiΔxt−i þ et ; ð3Þ
Table 1
Summary statistics.
Equity market Money market Bond market Indirect real estate market Currency market
Index name S&P 500 PHLX NASDAQ DOW 1-Y T-bill 1–3 bond 3–5 bond 5–7 bond 7–10 bond 20+ bond REIT USDX
Mean (%%) 0.0073 0.0120 0.0170 0.0110 0.0006 0.0019 0.0038 0.0028 0.0041 −0.0002 0.0040 −0.0073
Maximum (%) 0.1096 0.0923 0.1116 0.1051 0.0015 0.0075 0.0168 0.0268 0.0362 0.0432 0.1685 0.0252
Minimum (%) −0.0947 −0.0932 −0.0959 −0.0820 −0.0030 −0.0095 −0.0184 −0.0225 −0.0248 −0.0526 −0.2169 −0.0306
Std. Dev. (%) 0.0145 0.0198 0.0153 0.0132 0.0002 0.0011 0.0025 0.0038 0.0049 0.0098 0.0252 0.0054
Skewness −0.2887 −0.0836 −0.2015 −0.0545 −1.6813 −0.2044 −0.0331 0.0218 0.1357 −0.0412 −0.3658 −0.0853
Kurtosis 12.0658 5.0009 9.4087 12.3475 50.7706 11.6965 8.1274 6.8141 5.9173 5.0745 14.2729 5.0536
Jarque-Bera 6279*** 307*** 3137*** 6649*** 174,485*** 5767*** 2001*** 1107*** 653*** 328*** 9709*** 323***
Sum 0.1332 −0.2219 0.3142 0.2011 0.0101 0.0350 0.0694 0.0515 0.0749 −0.0038 0.0735 −0.1326
Sum Sq. Dev. 0.3819 0.7178 0.4250 0.3166 0.0001 0.0021 0.0112 0.0262 0.0430 0.1759 1.1597 0.0538
Observations 1826 1826 1826 1826 1826 1826 1826 1826 1826 1826 1826 1826
Notes: the summary statistics are the daily return series of 12 ﬁnancial products, which are calculated in natural logarithms of the original indices over the full sample period of January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2012. *** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1%
level.
Table 2
Unit root test of three subperiods of the subprime crisis.
Equity market Money market Bond market Indirect real estate market Currency market
Periods S&500 PHLX NASDAQ DOW 1-Y T-bill 1–3 bond 3–5 bond 5–7 bond 7–10 bond 20+ bond REIT USDX
Pre-crisis
C −20.776*** −15.501*** −15.225*** −8.993*** −8.660*** −15.523*** −9.785*** −20.890*** −19.859*** −19.833*** −18.899*** −20.535***
C,T −20.756*** −15.492*** −15.221*** −8.928*** −8.922*** −15.592*** −9.833*** −20.989*** −19.856*** −19.859*** −19.096*** −20.516***
In-crisis
C −12.743*** −22.937*** −17.419*** −12.563*** −13.983*** −8.191*** −16.887*** −16.655*** −15.782*** −15.803*** −10.770*** −19.647***
C,T −12.785*** −22.912*** −17.424*** −12.602*** −14.012*** −8.354*** −16.896*** −16.659*** −15.776*** −15.785*** −10.976*** −19.722***
After-crisis
C −5.524*** −12.598*** −5.471*** −5.097*** −11.236*** −11.334*** −13.475*** −11.037*** −11.642*** −8.103*** −4.783*** −7.903***
C,T −5.560*** −12.571*** −5.530*** −5.090*** −11.208*** −11.428*** −10.517*** −11.186*** −11.868*** −12.336*** −4.806*** −7.947***
Notes: C and T represent the use of constant and time trend in the augmented Dickey–Fuller test, respectively. The results show that all return series are stationary during the subprime crisis. The subprime crisis subperiods are January 1, 2006 to July
31, 2007 (pre-crisis), August 1 to March 30, 2009 (in-crisis), and April 1, 2009 to December 7, 2009 (after-crisis). *** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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223G.-D. Chang, P.-C. Cheng / Economic Modelling 58 (2016) 219–226where xt is a vector of the selected time series.γ is the coefﬁcient of xt−1
in the augmented Dickey–Fuller test. The null hypothesis of unit root
test is γ = 0, which implies that the time series are not stationary
against the alternative assumption γ b 0, which implies that the return
series are stationary at I(0). If the series are nonstationary under the
null hypothesis, the test statistic will have a nonstandard distribution.
The lag length k is 6 and 10 to correspondwith the lag of the VAR frame-
work for the subprime crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis, re-
spectively. If both return series xt and yt are stationary, we estimate
Eqs. (1) and (2) with ordinary least squares, and, consequently, we
can directly apply the Granger causality test. Thus, we examine the ev-
idence of contagion by comparing the change in Granger causality after
a crisis. For example, we determine contagion occurs from x(y) market
to y(x) market if x(y) does not cause y(x) in the stable period, but x(y)
Granger causes y(x) in a crisis period.
4. Empirical results
According to the deﬁnition that we adopt, contagion occurs when the
co-movement of two asset return series increases signiﬁcantly after a cri-
sis. Therefore, we examinewhether onemarket can predict another with
signiﬁcantGranger causality in theVAR framework for both the subprime
crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. By comparing the changes
in Granger causality, we ﬁnd cross-asset contagion onlywhen two condi-
tions are satisﬁed simultaneously: ﬁrst, when no Granger causality exists
between two markets in the stable periods (i.e., the pre-crisis periods of
the subprime and European sovereign debt crises; Periods 1 and 4),
and, second, when signiﬁcant Granger causality exists between twomar-
kets in the subprime and European sovereign debt crisis periods (i.e., the
in-crisis periods of both crises; Periods 2 and 5).
Table 4 provides the results of Granger causality for the three subsam-
ple periods for the subprime crisis from2006 to 2009. The numbers of sig-
niﬁcant Granger causality are 17, 35, and 18 for the pre-crisis, in-crisis,
after-crisis subperiods, respectively. The marked changes in the Granger
causality indicate that the co-movements of asset returns increase during
the subprime crisis. Then, we examine whether Granger causality be-
tween two kinds of asset returns is signiﬁcant after subprime crisis. We
ﬁnd 23 occurrences of cross-asset contagion, which we summarize into
eight conclusions. First, two contagion effects exist from equity to REITs,
and three contagion effects exist from equity to the bond market with
the maturity between 7 and 10 years. Second, no contagion occurs from
equity to the 1-year T-bill and the bond markets whose duration less
than 7 years. Third, the equity markets have Granger causality to the U.S.
dollar index both before and after the subprime crisis, which indicates
that it is not beneﬁcial to simultaneously hold U.S. equity and U.S. dollars
for diversiﬁcation at any time. Fourth, we ﬁnd contagion effects from
medium-term bondmarkets to the equity markets, in particular, the Phil-
adelphia Semiconductor Index and the NASDAQ. Fifth, the currency mar-
ket shows contagion only to equity markets, which supports our third
conclusion. Sixth, the equitymarkets showahigh internal contagion effect
which implies a high interaction. Seventh, the 1-year T-bill and 1–3 year
bondmarket is free from the contagion effect. Finally, REITs, whichwe as-
sume to be the origin of contagion during the subprime crisis, only have
two contagion effects: to U.S. dollar index and to S&P 500 index.
In practice, holding REITs, 1-year T-bills and 1–3 year bonds is bene-
ﬁcial for most cross-asset diversiﬁcation investors during the crisis, but
holding U.S. dollars with equity is not beneﬁcial. We believe that the
reason is because the cash outﬂows of the currency market cause the
equity market to turn downward during the crisis. The second and
fourth conclusions suggest that bond markets are the origin of conta-
gion, which indicates that the beneﬁt of cross-asset diversiﬁcation is re-
duced when investors hold bonds with equity during a crisis. In equity
markets, the internal contagion ﬁndings indicate that most equities di-
versiﬁcation is not efﬁcient during a crisis period. However, at this
time,most bonds diversiﬁcation is efﬁcient because little internal conta-
gion occurs between bond markets.
Table 4
Changes in Granger causality between markets in the subprime crisis subperiods.
Origin
S&500 PHLX NASDAQ DOW
Receiver Pre In After Pre In After Pre In After Pre In After
S&500 0.3877 0.0781 0.1471 0.5668 0.0186** 0.0452** 0.0162** 0.4062 0.4498 
PHLX 0.9464 0.0036*** 0.0433** 0.9879 0.0807 0.1621 0.8342 0.0041*** 0.0657 
NASDAQ 0.3994 0.0017*** 0.0406** 0.8531 0.3343 0.6556 0.1093 0.0159** 0.0608 
DOW 0.0677 0.3357 0.5290 0.2413 0.1440 0.3154 0.4086 0.1307 0.319 0
1-Y T-bill 0.9572 0.3182 0.2031 0.8068 0.7800 0.8083 0.8799 0.205 0.1941 0.8839 0.4246 0.0854 
1–3 bond 0.7955 0.2613 0.1667 0.7883 0.5120 0.2737 0.7449 0.3739 0.0781 0.9372 0.2229 0.1363 
3–5 bond 0.6075 0.1906 0.6831 0.7938 0.2321 0.6006 0.7614 0.2471 0.6387 0.7690 0.1368 0.6841 
5–7 bond 0.9744 0.0793 0.1687 0.9041 0.3485 0.4395 0.9958 0.2457 0.154 0 0.9977 0.0598 0.1637 
7–10 bond 0.9058 0.0445** 0.8746 0.8283 0.0154** 0.9363 0.9272 0.0667 0.8766 0.9329 0.0444** 0.8409 
20+ bond 0.9566 0.2135 0.8429 0.9374 0.0933 0.9225 0.9644 0.3418 0.9423 0.9849 0.2196 0.7910
REIT 0.6258 0.0032*** 0.0200** 0.6658 0.7808 0.0096*** 0.7090 0.1340 0.0048*** 0.4856 0.0048*** 0.0923 
USDX 0.0191** 0.0001*** 0.057 0.0745 0.0008*** 0.3007 0.0498** 0.0001*** 0.0519 0.0352** 0.0003*** 0.1405 
1-Y T-bill 1–3 bond 3–5 bond 5–7 bond
Receiver Pre In After Pre In After Pre In After Pre In After
S&500 0.0790 0.1454 0.4321 0.0558 0.3725 0.4390 0.0094*** 0.0104** 0.5767 0.0058*** 0.0028*** 0.5005 
PHLX 0.0060*** 0.0739 0.3695 0.9134 0.2244 0.6530 0.4432 0.0063*** 0.4406 0.5949 0.0032*** 0.3075 
NASDAQ 0.0077*** 0.2655 0.6200 0.2694 0.2908 0.4740 0.0221** 0.0115** 0.8335 0.0555 0.0028*** 0.6456 
DOW 0.1709 0.1344 0.3970 0.0456** 0.3102 0.5260 0.0083*** 0.0087*** 0.7154 0.0063*** 0.0019*** 0.7180
1-Y T-bill 0.1817 0.0354** 0.3560 0.3022 0.0629 0.2037 0.7233 0.1915 0.0077***
1–3bond 0.6147 0.3959 0.3416 0.1135 0.2460 0.2400 0.4496 0.3611 0.4829 
3–5 bond 0.4066 0.2739 0.0247** 0.1169 0.1215 0.8005 0.9051 0.3265 0.5001 
5–7 bond 0.4414 0.5890 0.0196** 0.5972 0.2002 0.6315 0.8544 0.1046 0.1843 
7–10 bond 0.4784 0.2752 0.0619 0.3481 0.2599 0.5946 0.7110 0.1477 0.6392 0.8035 0.1779 0.3230
20+ bond 0.5640 0.5001 0.0502 0.1646 0.0756 0.8523 0.1454 0.0010*** 0.9356 0.4848 0.5941 0.3484 
REIT 0.1867 0.1129 0.2606 0.3548 0.7919 0.5739 0.1824 0.1747 0.9772 0.2262 0.2214 0.7479 
USDX 0.7911 0.0652 0.6952 0.3259 0.5118 0.5170 0.2741 0.6024 0.8463 0.5195 0.1436 0.6707 
7–10 bond 20+ bond REIT USDX
Receiver Pre In After Pre In After Pre In After Pre In After
S&500 0.0302** 0.0017*** 0.4527 0.0122** 0.0818 0.2701 0.5341 0.0293** 0.0012*** 0.7854 0.0143** 0.1602 
PHLX 0.5255 0.0041*** 0.138 0 0.5906 0.1176 0.1582 0.6157 0.9351 0.0166** 0.8840 0.1725 0.0115**
NASDAQ 0.0946 0.0063*** 0.5299 0.0469** 0.1605 0.5159 0.3364 0.2691 0.0212** 0.3260 0.0439** 0.0572 
DOW 0.0227** 0.0009*** 0.6143 0.0095*** 0.0465** 0.4054 0.4217 0.0690 0.0114** 0.8526 0.0064*** 0.1252 
1-Y T-bill 0.1662 0.1269 0.1289 0.4009 0.1276 0.1667 0.9856 0.8065 0.4411 0.2583 0.3117 0.0997 
1–3 bond 0.5719 0.2308 0.0436** 0.3545 0.1074 0.1005 0.3737 0.2850 0.3644 0.9541 0.6528 0.0317**
3–5 bond 0.8217 0.6222 0.8055 0.5138 0.0930 0.7842 0.5438 0.7463 0.7980 0.8915 0.7566 0.0509 
5–7 bond 0.8463 0.2736 0.3985 0.3416 0.1051 0.3289 0.6213 0.1623 0.8445 0.9884 0.7352 0.0181**
7–10 bond 0.3380 0.0386** 0.3877 0.8177 0.6458 0.8989 0.3319 0.4216 0.0396**
20+ bond 0.5229 0.1238 0.2067 0.844 0.7364 0.8922 0.3828 0.2103 0.2720
REIT 0.2252 0.1613 0.7459 0.2934 0.1393 0.9561 0.4441 0.3580 0.2551 
USDX 0.1819 0.3070 0.4676 0.0870 0.0652 0.7142 0.1862 0.000002*** 0.0824 
Notes: This table shows the significant level results of Granger causality in the pre-crisis, in-crisis, after-crisis periods for the subprime crisis. Our results show that the cross-asset  
contagion exists when two conditions are satisfied simultaneously: first, no Granger causality exists between two markets in the pre-crisis subperiod, and, second, significant Granger  
causality exists between two markets in the in-crisis subperiod. Therefore, we find 23 contagion effects marked in gray. The contagion effects are not from the equity market to other
markets except for the 7–10 year bond market. In particular,no contagion effect occurs from the equity market to the money market and the short-term and medium-term bond market
with the duration less than 7 years. However, the equity market shows contagion effects from the currency market and the medium-term bond markets. These results suggest that 
the origin of contagion   of equity markets is the bonds market and currency market, where the bond markets of maturity between 3 and10 years are significantly dominant during
the subprime crisis. The cash outflow from the currency market results in the contagion of the equity market. Finally, the results here also violate our assumption that the REIT market
is the origin of contagion because only two contagion effects originate from the REIT market. Also, we find only one contagion effect in the money market and short-term bond markets
combined;   thus, they are somewhat immune to the contagion effect. *** and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
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ple periods during the European sovereign debt crisis from 2009 to 2012.
The numbers of signiﬁcant Granger causality are 18, 7, and 22 for the pre-
crisis, in-crisis, and after-crisis subperiods, respectively. Little contagion
occurs during the European sovereign debt crisis. We believe that the
European sovereign debt crisis does not inﬂuence U.S. investors. The re-
sult is indirectly supported by Baur (2010), who concludes that the origin
of contagion is always fromU.S. equity or U.S. bondmarkets in the global
crisis. However, we still ﬁnd ﬁve results that provide evidence of conta-
gion during the European sovereign debt crisis. This evidence also sup-
ports our supposition that contagion can occur from bond markets to
the equity market. However, the low number of contagion ﬁndings sug-
gests that the Granger causality structure changes little during the
European sovereign debt crisis. That is, the European sovereign debt crisis
is not a big structural shock to the ﬁnancial markets, which have experi-
enced the serious fallouts of the subprime crisis.5. Conclusion
This study examines the effectiveness of domestic diversiﬁcation by
testing cross-asset contagion among REIT, money, equity, bond, and
currency markets, which are the main investment segments of inves-
tors' portfolio within most countries. Using a method similar to the
method of Matei (2010), we examine changes in the Granger causality
structure after the subprime crisis and the European sovereign debt cri-
sis to determine evidence of contagion. In line with Longstaff (2010)
and to expand the beneﬁts of our paper, we choose 12 ﬁnancial prod-
ucts in ﬁve different assets. Baur (2010) provides many assumptions
and the inspiration for this study. Our data is collected from Datastream
from January 2006 to December 2012 and divided into six subperiods:
three subprime crisis subperiods (pre-crisis, in-crisis, and after-crisis)
and three European sovereign debt crisis subperiods (pre-crisis, in-
crisis, and after-crisis).
Table 5
The changes of Granger causality between markets in the European debt crisis.
Origin
S&500 PHLX NASDAQ DOW
Receiver Pre In After Pre In After Pre In After Pre In After
S& 500 0.0162** 0.3341 0.0308** 0.1458 0.1817 0.3181 0.1575 0.4485 0.0402**
PHLX 0.0298** 0.9526 0.6423 0.0138** 0.8584 0.3056 0.0643 0.9209 0.4553 
NASDAQ 0.1314 0.4516 0.2732 0.0213** 0.7589 0.0527 0.1719 0.6142 0.0774 
DOW 0.0343** 0.4241 0.0113** 0.0951 0.2813 0.0041*** 0.0877 0.3570 0.0570 
1-Y T-bill 0.3150 0.2133 0.2760 0.4949 0.3613 0.1929 0.2216 0.2146 0.2529 0.1999 0.2364 0.3780 
1–3 bond 0.4537 0.2609 0.7357 0.2708 0.2896 0.8537 0.1866 0.3157 0.8447 0.4281 0.4644 0.6212 
3–5 bond 0.9046 0.6311 0.8825 0.7458 0.7756 0.3308 0.8758 0.6973 0.903 0.8918 0.7180 0.7849 
5–7 bond 0.3683 0.4767 0.6022 0.5017 0.6170 0.3014 0.3215 0.4533 0.6445 0.3203 0.6199 0.4912 
7–10 bond 0.9815 0.3917 0.6137 0.9871 0.7221 0.3561 0.9696 0.3964 0.7161 0.9481 0.4570 0.5138 
20+ bond 0.9067 0.2526 0.0885 0.9079 0.3577 0.0530 0.8981 0.3293 0.2055 0.8147 0.3491 0.0891 
REIT 0.0888 0.7384 0.2350 0.0161** 0.5422 0.2916 0.0417** 0.4043 0.6126 0.2651 0.8230 0.0286**
USDX 0.0410** 0.3742 0.0612 0.0901 0.5706 0.0595 0.0371** 0.4881 0.0121** 0.1602 0.3326 0.2625 
4 1–3 bond 3–5 bond 5–7 bond
Receiver Pre In After Pre In After Pre In After Pre In After
S&500 0.3784 0.5160 0.2013 0.7346 0.0509 0.3315 0.3495 0.1807 0.1503 0.4839 0.1910 0.1816 
PHLX 0.0583 0.3322 0.7050 0.3773 0.1349 0.2382 0.4993 0.3380 0.0455** 0.2400 0.2244 0.0399**
NASDAQ 0.5001 0.5534 0.2243 0.8212 0.0668 0.2637 0.7897 0.2244 0.0494** 0.6483 0.1934 0.0556 
DOW 0.5796 0.4274 0.2236 0.7490 0.0239** 0.3647 0.2964 0.1496 0.186 0.7258 0.1574 0.1880 
1-Y T-bill 0.3550 0.5867 0.0016*** 0.3441 0.6650 0.307 0.0077*** 0.6772 0.0829 
1–3 bond 0.4945 0.8450 0.4456 0.2342 0.2520 0.0119** 0.2849 0.6068 0.5117 
3–5 bond 0.0468** 0.3852 0.7811 0.7391 0.9000 0.5756 0.2093 0.7658 0.9805 
5–7 bond 0.0163** 0.6935 0.5815 0.4378 0.1184 0.0304** 0.4730 0.3046 0.5938 
7–10 bond 0.0641 0.9376 0.6872 0.9162 0.0186** 0.2094 0.5152 0.0779 0.6699 0.0433** 0.0001*** 0.8932 
20+ bond 0.1198 0.4461 0.6506 0.8641 0.2080 0.9488 0.9901 0.3497 0.6425 0.7253 0.1860 0.9929 
REIT 0.1521 0.9258 0.0473** 0.8378 0.1658 0.3982 0.8799 0.3667 0.2645 0.7076 0.2519 0.5431 
USDX 0.9453 0.1946 0.657 0.3495 0.1726 0.7403 0.5672 0.9609 0.7781 0.4251 0.6109 0.924 0
7–10 bond 20+bond REIT USDX
Receiver Pre In After Pre In After Pre In After Pre In After
S&500 0.6532 0.2538 0.0412** 0.327 0.289 0.0554 0.0181** 0.6553 0.0393** 0.4722 0.3568 0.3788 
PHLX 0.6012 0.4929 0.0351** 0.5457 0.3596 0.0797 0.1458 0.8503 0.6178 0.0147** 0.3223 0.2181 
NASDAQ 0.5873 0.3653 0.0123** 0.524 0.2897 0.0359** 0.3027 0.7269 0.4681 0.277 0.301 0.0961 
DOW 0.8122 0.1444 0.0292** 0.5147 0.1316 0.0224** 0.0312** 0.8189 0.0034*** 0.4246 0.2564 0.4052 
1-Y T-bill 0.0792 0.7927 0.2609 0.1198 0.9951 0.5995 0.2887 0.0502 0.5644 0.115 0.2731 0.5601 
1–3 bond 0.0529 0.0417** 0.6662 0.0436** 0.1304 0.3938 0.8125 0.3461 0.7627 0.1618 0.8324 0.2534 
3–5 bond 0.3736 0.1362 0.7899 0.6678 0.1997 0.6932 0.8725 0.8528 0.5755 0.1598 0.7314 0.6451 
5–7 bond 0.0702 0.0001*** 0.7424 0.5935 0.0469** 0.2391 0.7977 0.5825 0.4103 0.0577 0.7601 0.4087 
7–10 bond 0.1368 0.0111** 0.1877 0.8508 0.4524 0.4641 0.1848 0.6298 0.4728 
20+ bond 0.2608 0.0519 0.7864 0.9892 0.803 0.0992 0.4817 0.6645 0.3286 
REIT 0.5366 0.3657 0.3963 0.7781 0.5026 0.375 0.6983 0.4296 0.3688 
USDX 0.5599 0.446 0.8558 0.8446 0.443 0.7789 0.0246** 0.5863 0.0086***
Notes: This table shows the test results of Granger causality in the pre-crisis, in-crisis and after-crisis subperiods of the European debt crisis. Given our definition of contagion, cross-asset
contagion exists when two conditions are satisfied simultaneously: first, no Granger causality exists between two markets in the pre-crisis period, and second, significant Granger causality
exists between two markets in the in-crisis period. We find only 6 contagion effects, much fewer than 23 contagion effects in the subprime crisis shown in Table 4. The test results in gray
show that in the pre-crisis subperiod there is no Granger causality, but in the in-crisis subperiod there exists Granger causality. This indicates significant evidence of cross-asset contagion
in U.S. markets in the European debt crisis. The results show that the contagion effects from the equity market to other markets are very low. In particular, no contagion effect exists from
the S&P500 to other markets. Also, no contagion effect exists from the equity, REIT, currency, and money markets to any other markets. Although the results provide little evidence of con-
tagion effects in the European debt crisis, the origin of contagion is still from the bond market. Furthermore, because the pre-crisis subperiod of the European debt crisis and the after-crisis
subperiod of the subprime crisis overlap, our results confirm that the changes of Granger causality structure between markets are very limited when the European sovereign debt crisis
occurs. This finding suggests that the European debt crisis is neither an independent nor a big shock to the global financial market after the subprime crisis. *** and ** indicate significance at
the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
225G.-D. Chang, P.-C. Cheng / Economic Modelling 58 (2016) 219–226Our major contributions to the existing literature are threefold. First,
statistically signiﬁcant contagion exists from medium-term bond mar-
kets to equity markets. Second, REIT markets, money markets, and
short-term bond markets show little evidence of cross-asset contagion
with other markets. Finally, the currency market shows high co-
movement and contagion with equity markets. Therefore, we suggest
two reallocating strategies. First, the investors who invest in both bond
and equitymarkets before a crisis should consider reallocating their port-
folio into REITs andmoneymarkets to beneﬁt from diversiﬁcation during
a crisis period. Second, holding U.S. dollars and equity at the same time is
not beneﬁcial.
Several other important ﬁndings stem from this analysis. First, the
medium-term bond markets are the origin of contagion in the United
States during the two crisis periods. This result contradicts the assump-
tion that the real estatemarket is the cause of the contagion. Second, the
results show little evidence of contagion during the European sovereigndebt crisis, which indirectly supports Baur (2010) who concludes that
the origin of contagion is always from the U.S. equity or U.S. bond
market in global crisis. In other words, the collapsing of foreignmarkets
does not inﬂuence U.S. markets.
Our empirical results clearly support thepresence of cross-asset con-
tagion in U.S. markets during the two global ﬁnancial crisis periods.
However, our ﬁndings need further investigation to determinewhether
the origin of contagion is always from thebondmarket to otherﬁnancial
markets in different crises. In addition, our paper only focuses on the
cross-asset contagion in the U.S. markets. We therefore encourage the
inclusion of more markets in different countries for future studies.
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Appendix A. The deﬁnition of six subperiodsCrisis Subperiod
deﬁnition
Time (mm/dd/yyyyy) Events
Subprime crisis
Period 1 Pre-crisis 01/01/2006 to
07/31/2007
Period 2 In-crisis 08/01/2007 to
03/30/2009
US subprime default
rates soaring
Period 3 After-crisis 03/31/2009 to
12/07/2009
Beginning of
quantitative
easing (QE)
European debt
crisis
Period 4 Pre-crisis 03/31/2009 to
12/07/2009
Period 5 In-crisis 12/08/2009 to
03/11/2011
Greek government
bond crisis spreading
Period 6 After-crisis 03/12/2011 to
31/12/2012
The Euro Plus Pact
adopted
Notes: Period 3 and Period 4 are overlapped. To capture the phenomenon of the two crises,
we assume that some contagion effects of the European sovereign debt crisis are the fallout
of the subprime crisis. The ﬁrst structural break starts from July 2007when the US subprime
default rates are soaring. The second structural break starts fromMarch 2009 when the US
Fed carries out the ﬁrst round of quantitative easing (QE1). The third structural break starts
fromDecember 2009when theGreek government bond crisis is spreading. The fourth struc-
tural break starts fromMarch 2011 when the European Union adopts the Euro Plus Pact.References
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